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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW
The caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all
named parties in the proceedings in the district court. However,
at trial in this matter W. Kevin Jackson, Esq., of Jensen, Duffin,
Carman, Dibb & Jackson entered an appearance on behalf of "the Baum
child" (the defendant) and his father, Douglas H. Baum, and Gary L.
Johnson, Esq., of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson entered an
appearance

on behalf

of United

States Fidelity

and Guaranty

Company, which issued an insurance policy to the defendant's
father.

See Record at 237.
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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Utah Code.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the facts of this case, did the trial court abuse its
discretion when it denied the defendant's motion to set aside the
default and default judgment entered against him?
Standard of Review:

A trial court has broad discretion in

ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment, and its
decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of
discretion is "clearly established." Airkem Intermountain. Inc. v.
Parker. 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973) . See also Russell
v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984); Board of Educ. of
Granite School Dist. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, 807
(1963)

(an

appellate

court

will

disturb

the

trial

discretion only if there is "a patent abuse thereof").

court's

On review

of a trial court's order denying a motion to set aside a default
judgment, the facts are viewed in the strongest light in favor of
the trial court's decision.

Goalia v. Bodnar. 749 P.2d 921, 929

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
DETERMINATIVE RULE
Rule

60(b)

of

the

Utah

Rules

determinative of the issue on appeal.
the addendum.

- 1 -

of

Civil

Procedure

is

The rule is reproduced in

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an action to recover for personal injuries the

plaintiff

suffered as a result of a one-car accident.

The

plaintiff was a passenger in the car, and the defendant was the
driver.
B.

Record ("R.") at 2-3.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
The plaintiff filed this action in Third District Court on

January 31, 1992. R. at 2-3. The defendant was personally served
with process on February 11, 1992. The defendant failed to answer,
and his default was entered on May 18, 1992.

Id. at 9.

On June 16, 1992, the case was tried to the court on the issue
of damages, id. at 2 34-313, and a judgment in the amount of
$5,623,839 was entered against the defendant on June 17, 1992, id.
at 17-18.
On September 11, 1992, the defendant filed a motion to set
aside the default and default judgment.

Id.

at 169.

The court

denied the motion and entered an order to that effect on October
19, 1992. Id. at 207-08. On October 21, 1992, the defendant filed
an objection to the proposed order denying his motion to set aside
the default judgment.

Id. at 210-11.

On December 1, 1992, the

court entered an order denying the defendant's objection and
providing that its prior order denying the defendant's motion to
set aside the default and default judgment would be deemed entered
as of December 1, 1992.

Id. at 218.
- 2 -

On December 21, 1992, the

defendant appealed the order denying his motion to set aside the
default and default judgment to the Utah Court of Appeals.
221.

Id. at

The court of appeals determined that it did not have

jurisdiction over the appeal and transferred the appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 44. Id.
at 227-28. On March 24, 1993, the supreme court assigned the case
to the court of appeals.
C,

Statement of Facts
On June 1, 1991, the plaintiff, Toby Slingerland, and the

defendant, Douglas Baum, were returning from Wendover to Salt Lake
City in Baum's car. R. at 256. Baum was driving, and Slingerland,
his passenger, was asleep. Id. Baum fell asleep at the wheel, the
car rolled, and Slingerland was left a quadriplegic as a result of
the accident.
Shortly

Id. at 2 I 4 & 176 f 2.
after the accident, Baum notified

United

States

Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company ("USF&G11) of the accident
and requested coverage.

Id. at 177 f 3.

would not cover the accident.

USF&G told him that it

Id. f 4.

Slingerland filed this action on January 31, 1992, to recover
for the injuries he sustained as a result of Baum's negligence.
Id. at 2-3.

Baum was duly served with a summons and complaint on

February 11, 1992.

Id. at 5-7.

Baum discussed the lawsuit with an attorney, who advised him
that liability was almost certain and that "probably [his] best

- 3 -

option would be to eventually file for bankruptcy."

Id. at 177 5

9.
Baum did not file an answer, and on May 18, 1992, his default
was entered.

Id. at 9.

That same day, the judge assigned to the case informed
Slingerland's attorney that she was acquainted with Slingerland/s
aunt and would recuse herself if the parties felt it was necessary.
Id. at 8. The court ordered Slingerland's attorney to contact the
defendant and inform him of the court's position, which he did by
a letter dated May 19, 1992.

See id. at 8 & 10.

notified Baum of the scheduled trial date.

Counsel also

Id. at 10.

Baum did

not respond to this letter, but the trial judge, on her own motion,
recused herself, and the case was reassigned.

Id. at 11 & 12.

A trial on the issue of damages was held on June 16, 1992.
See id. at 234. At the trial, David R. Olsen appeared on behalf of
the plaintiff, Slingerland.

The court also noted the appearances

of Gary L. Johnson representing USF&G and Kevin Jackson, who stated
he was representing "the father, the Baum child, the insurance
policy in question." Id. at 237; see also jld. at 235. Mr. Johnson
and Mr. Jackson indicated that they were there to "monitor" the
proceedings.

The court

invited

them

to participate

in the

proceedings:
If either of you had any interest in respect to your
respective clients in terms of examining or questioning
any of the evidence that might be presented before the
court I would like to hear that. I'm not inviting major
contest, if that's not appropriate. You know your case
- 4 -

better than I do, but at the same time if there were to
be information that could help me evaluate this better it
would be appreciated.
Id. at 238. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Jackson acknowledged the court's
invitation, id., but declined to ask any questions of the witnesses
or make any other comments.
At the close of the evidence, the court repeated its offer to
let counsel make any inquiries of witnesses or any comments they
wished to make.
declined.

Id.

Id. at 307.

Again, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Jackson

The court then made its ruling on damages, and a

judgment was entered in favor of Mr. Slingerland and against Mr.
Baum as follows:
Special damages:

$4,623,839

General damages:

$1,000,000

Total damages:

$5,623,839

Id. at 17-18.
On July 9, 1992, USF&G filed an action against Baum, his
father and Slingerland in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, seeking a declaratory judgment that it owed no
duty to defend against or provide coverage for Slingerland's
claims.

See id. at 188; Appellant's Brief at 4 f 10.

On August 18, 1992, the Baums filed a counterclaim against
USF&G in the declaratory judgment action alleging that USF&G had
acted in bad faith in refusing to settle Slingerland's claims for
the $100,000 policy limit.

See R. at 188 5 7.

- 5 -

After the Baums counterclaimed for bad faith, USF&G retained
new counsel to represent Baum.

Appellant's Brief at 4 5 11 & 13.

On September 11, 1992, almost three months after the judgment was
entered, the new counsel USF&G had retained for Baum filed a motion
to set aside the default and default judgment.

R. at 169.

The

court denied Baum's motion to set aside the default and default
judgment, id. at 208 & 218-19, and this appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court had considerable discretion under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) in ruling on Baum's motion to set aside the
default judgment entered against him.

Before Baum could have the

judgment set aside, he had to clearly establish

(1) that the

judgment was entered as a result of mistake, inadvertence or
excusable neglect, (2) that his motion to set aside the judgment
was timely, (3) that he had a meritorious defense to Slingerland's
claim, and (4) that Slingerland would not be prejudiced if the
judgment were set aside.
None of the factors Baum relied on constituted mistake,
inadvertence or excusable neglect within the meaning of rule 60(b) .
Thus, Baum did not meet his burden of showing a sufficient excuse
for his default. In fact, Baum's own testimony clearly established
that the default judgment entered against him was the result of his
own deliberate decision to suffer a default judgment rather than
incur the costs of defending this action.

That decision was made

only after he had consulted with counsel of his choice. Rule 60(b)
- 6 -

does not authorize the court to grant relief from poor tactical
decisions.

See Point I.

The trial court therefore did not have to reach the issues of
timeliness, meritorious defense and prejudice. Nevertheless, Baum
did not meet his burden of showing that his motion was timely, see
point II; that his alleged defenses would have led to a different
result, see point III; or that Slingerland would not be prejudiced
if the judgment were set aside, see point IV.
Thus, under the facts of this case, "the lower court did not
err [in refusing to set aside the default judgment], but . . .
[Baum] did by urging too little too late." See Heath v. Heath, 541
P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1975).
ARGUMENT
I.
BAUM DID NOT MEET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING SUFFICIENT GROUNDS
TO JUSTIFY SETTING ASIDE THE DEFAULT AND JUDGMENT.
Baum argues that default judgments are generally disfavored
because they run counter to the policy favoring resolution of
disputes on their merits. However, Utah courts have consistently
rejected the argument that that policy alone justifies setting
aside a default judgment. See, e.g., State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d
1053, 1055 (Utah 1983); Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855, 858 (Utah
1979); Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513
P.2d 429, 431 (1973); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260
P.2d 741, 742-44 (1953). That is because there are equally strong
- 7 -

countervailing policies, such as "the strong policy favoring the
finality of judgments."
(Cal.

1969)

See Kulchar v. Kulchar, 462 P.2d 17, 19

(Traynor, C.J.)*

"Obviously, the

[plaintiffs]

interest[s] must also be protected . . . ." Larsen v. Collina, 684
P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1984) ; see also Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch. Inc. ,
589 P.2d 767, 768 (Utah 1978).
A rule which would permit the re-opening of cases
previously decided because of error or ignorance during
the progress of the trial would in a large measure
vitiate the effects of res judicata and create a hardship
to the successful litigant in causing him to prosecute
his action more than once and possibly lose the ability
to collect his judgment . . . .
Warren, 260 P.2d at 743.
The "more pertinent" public policies in a case such as this
are those found in the rules of civil procedure governing the time
for answering a complaint and the setting aside of judgments. Cf.
Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah
1987) .

"Public policy requires that pressure be brought upon

litigants to use great care in preparing cases for trial and in
ascertaining all the facts."

Kulchar, 462 P. 2d at 19 (quoting

Restatement of Judgments § 126 comment a) . The rules of procedure
"are positive in their application and are designed to expedite
litigation."

Warren, 260 P.2d at 744.

They give the parties an

opportunity to have their case tried on the merits, but a party
does not have to take advantage of that opportunity.

If the

requirements of the rules of civil procedure are met, a judgment
will not be set aside "merely because the particular individual
- 8 -

against whom it was rendered did not in fact have an opportunity to
present his claim or defense."

Id. at 743.

If a default judgment could be set aside merely because the
defendant, who had notice of the action and an opportunity to
appear and defend, had not been heard on the merits, the rules of
civil procedure would be nullified and our system of justice
undermined.

See Warren, 260 P.2d at 743-44. Thus, this court has

held that "the requirements of public policy demand more than a
mere statement that a person did not have his day in court when
full opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded to him . . . ."
Id. at 744; Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker. 30 Utah 2d 65,
513 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973).

Courts deny relief "if a party has

been given notice of an action and has not been prevented from
participating therein."

Kulchar, 462 P.2d at 19.

Whether or not a default judgment should be set aside depends
on the "peculiar facts and circumstances" of the particular case.
Heath v. Mower. 597 P.2d 855, 858 (Utah 1979).

The Utah Supreme

Court has therefore committed the decision to grant or deny relief
from judgments to the sound discretion of the trial court.

The

trial court has considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to
set aside a default judgment, and an appellate court will reverse
its ruling
discretion."

"only if it is clear the trial court abused its
Russell v. Martell. 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984)

(emphasis added).

Accord Masters v. LeSeuerf 13 Utah 2d 293, 373

P.2d 573, 573-74 (1962).

The rule that courts will generally
- 9 -

"incline towards" granting relief to a party who has not had an
opportunity to be heard "is ordinarily applied at the trial court
level," in the exercise of that court's broad discretion. Warren,
260 P.2d at 744; Airkem, 513 P.2d at 431. The fact that the trial
court could have granted a defaulting party an opportunity to be
heard does not mean that the court abused its discretion in denying
relief.

Warren, 260 P.2d at 744.

See also Katz v. Pierce, 732

P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) ("That some basis may exist to set aside
the default does not require the conclusion that the court abused
its discretion in refusing to do so when facts and circumstances
support the refusal").
The cases Baum relies on for his policy

argument

"are

predicated upon the hypothesis that there has been some mistake or
excusable neglect on the part of the movant from which, in justice
and equity, he should be relieved."

Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah

2d 415, 303 P.2d 995, 996 (1956). Thus, the "pertinent inquiry" is
not whether Baum had his day in court but whether the trial court
abused

its discretion

in concluding

that Baum did

not show

sufficient justification for setting aside the default judgment.
See Chrysler, 303 P.2d at 996.
Motions to set aside default judgments are governed by Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which states:

"On motion and upon

such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
- 10 -

excusable neglect
added).1

. . . ."

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)

(emphasis

If the trial court could have concluded from the record

that Baum's asserted justification for setting the judgment aside
did not amount to mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, then
its order denying Baum relief from that judgment must be affirmed.
See, e.g., Warren, 260 P.2d at 744.

See also Western Union Tel.

Co. v. Dismang, 106 F.2d 362, 364 (10th Cir. 1939) ("It is an abuse
of discretion . . . to open or vacate a judgment where the moving
party shows no legal ground therefor or offers no excuse for his
own negligence or default").
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

generally

found

mistake,

inadvertence or excusable neglect only where it appeared that the
defendant may not have received proper notice, where the defendant
was induced not to file an answer by the plaintiff or the court or
where the defendant was prevented from doing so by circumstances
beyond his control. See, e.g. , May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110
(Utah 1984) (the evidence was contradictory as to whether the
defendant ever received the complaint); Helgesen v. Invangumia, 63 6
P.2d 1079, 1081-82 (Utah 1981) (the plaintiff knew the defendant
intended to defend, failed to provide requested information, and
gave the impression that no default would be taken) .

See also

Valley Leasing v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959, 960 (Utah 1983) (no abuse
1

Although rule 60(b) lists seven reasons for setting aside
a judgment, Baum relies only on the first of these. He claims that
the judgment should be set aside only for "mistake, inadvertence,
or excusable neglect." See Appellants Brief at 6.
- 11 -

of discretion to refuse to set aside a default judgment where
defendant made no showing that he was prevented from appearing by
circumstances

beyond

his

control); Airkem.

513

P.2d

at

431

(defendant must show that he used due diligence and was prevented
from appearing by circumstances beyond his control); Warren, 260
P.2d at 742 (relief may be granted for procedural difficulties, the
wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the
presentation of a claim or defense).
Baum claims that, at the time the default was entered, he was
a young man with no legal experience, he was suffering emotional
distress from having been sued by his best friend and was in a
state of confusion, partly as a result of his conversations with an
attorney, who told him that he had little option but to declare
bankruptcy, and with USF&G, which told him that he had no insurance
coverage.

As a result, he felt that his only option was to do

nothing. Baum claims that his mistaken judgment and confused state
of mind constitute "mistake" and "excusable neglect" within the
meaning of rule 60(b) (1) . See Appellant's Brief at 8-9. Cf. R. at
176-78.

The trial court properly rejected these arguments.

Baum's

claims

of

youth

and

legal

inexperience

insufficient to justify setting aside the judgment.

were

There was no

evidence of Baum's age at the time this action was filed.

See R.

at 176-78. Nevertheless, Baum admits that he was twenty-two years
old at the time the default was entered, see Appellant's Brief at
8; R. at 172, which is well past the age of majority and well past
- 12 -

the age for which a person becomes responsible for his actions.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 15-2-1 (1992) & 76-2-301 (1990).
Moreover, Baum's actions belie his claim that he lacked
sophistication in legal matters.2

He contacted his insurance

company even before any action was filed, notifying it of the
accident and requesting coverage.
the advice of an attorney.

R. at 177 1 3.

Id. J 9.

He also sought

And his family attorney

appeared at the trial on damages. Xd. at 237.
In any event, Utah courts have rejected the argument that
inexperience with the legal process is a sufficient reason to set
aside a default judgment, especially where, as here, the defendant
in fact discussed the matter with an attorney.

See, e.g., J.P.W.

Enters.. Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1979).

Accord

Original Appalachian Artworks. Inc. v. Yuil Int'l Trading Corp.,
105 F.R.D. 113, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

See also Bahr v. Paskv, 439

A.2d 174, 175-78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (inexperience with legal
matters

and

judgment).

illness do not

justify

setting

aside a default

Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that Baum,s age and alleged lack of legal experience did
not excuse his failure to answer Slingerland's complaint.
Baum's claimed

emotional distress and confusion did not

justify relief from the judgment either. See, e.g.. Smallridge v.
2

Baum's lack of legal experience stems from the fact that he
had never been sued before. R. at 177 5 7. He cites no authority,
however, for his proposed rule that every defendant is entitled to
his first default.
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Macalaster Bicknell Co, of N,Y.t 522 N.Y.S.2d 52, 52 (App. Div.
1987) (confusion and great personal stress were insufficient to
justify default). "Illness alone is not sufficient to make neglect
in defending one's action excusable." Warren, 260 P.2d at 743. In
Warren, the defendant claimed that he had been seriously ill at the
time he was served. The court stated:

"We are not told the nature

of the illness [but] it does not appear that [the defendant] was so
incapacitated that he could not have called an attorney to have his
rights . . . protected."

260 P.2d at 743.

Here, Baum claims he

was emotionally ill, not physically ill, as the defendant in Warren
apparently claimed, but the distinction is irrelevant.

Baum does

not claim that his emotional state prevented him from consulting an
attorney.

Rather, he admits that he in fact sought and followed

legal advice.
Nor does Baum claim that he was unaware of the consequences of
his failure to respond to Slingerland's complaint.

Baum does not

claim, for example, that he was so incapacitated that he could not
read and understand the summons. The summons was "self-explanatory
to anyone who can read." Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v.
Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (1963).

It clearly stated

that Baum was required to file an answer in writing within twenty
days and that, "[i]f you fail to do so, judgment by default will be
taken against you for the relief demanded in [the] Complaint."

R.

at 5. Cf. Bahr, 439 A.2d at 178 (where the defendant's illness did

- 14 -

not prevent her from reading the papers served on herf her failure
to respond was inexcusable).
Baum does not claim that the attorney he consulted told him he
did not have to answer the complaint.

He only claims that the

attorney told him that "liability is almost certain" (which it
would

be

even

if

a

jury

were

to

apportion

some

fault

to

Slingerland), that Slingerland's claim would be dischargeable in
bankruptcy and that Baum's "best option" would "probably" be to
eventually file for bankruptcy.3

R. at 177 5 9.

There is no

evidence that Baum or the attorney he consulted could not have
filed an answer or asked for an extension of time within the
required time. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding that Baum's alleged confusion did not justify setting
aside the default judgment.
Finally, any dispute between Baum and USF&G regarding coverage
did not excuse Baum's default.

Baum admits that USF&G told him

that there was no coverage for the lawsuit even before it was

3

Baum does not claim that this advice was bad. But even if
he did, that would not constitute mistake or excusable neglect.
See, e.g. , Russell v. Martell, 681 P. 2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984) (any
negligence on the part of the defendant's attorney was attributable
to the defendant); Gardiner & Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d
429, 430 (Utah 1982) (the negligence of the defendant's attorney
may be imputed to him) . See also St. Joe Paper Co. v. Marc Box
Co.. 394 A.2d 1045, 1047-48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (mere confusion
or mistake or inadvertence of counsel, without more, is
insufficient to set aside a default).
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filed.4

He still had over three months to find an attorney and

file an answer. Even if Baum's failure to respond to Slingerland's
complaint was the result of USF&G's actions, USF&G's actions did
not excuse Baum's neglect. See Goalia v. Bodnar, 749 P.2d 921, 929
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (the defendant's failure to take any action
for two months after his insurer told him he would have to handle
the case himself was inexcusable); Cyrus v. Haveson, 135 Cal. Rptr.
246, 252

(Cal. Ct. App. 1976)

(reliance on an insurer after

defendants had notice that the insurer was not protecting their
position in the litigation was inexcusable neglect).
In short, Baum did not meet his burden of showing such a
mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect as would justify relief
under

rule

60(b)(1).

At

a

minimum,

the

facts

showed

an

indifference and lack of diligence on the part of all concerned,
which are not grounds for vacating a default judgment. See Russell
v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984).
4

But in fact, the

Baum claims that he talked to Slingerland's lawyer and, as
a result of those conversations, "I was of the understanding that
he would try to work things out with the insurance company." R. at
177 f 8. Obviously, Slingerland's attorney was not able to "work
things out" with USF&G. That's why Slingerland had to file this
action.
In any event, Baum does not say that Slingerland's
attorney ever told him that he did not have to respond to the
complaint. Neither settlement discussions nor conversations with
opposing counsel constitute mistake or excusable neglect where, as
here, the defendant seeks independent counsel and counsel for the
plaintiff does nothing to indicate that the defendant does not have
to answer the complaint. See Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93-94
(Utah 1986). Cf. Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc. v. Myers. 534 P.2d 616,
617 (Utah 1975) (where defendant assumed the action had been taken
care of and therefore took no steps to answer the complaint, his
claim did not even approach "excusable neglect").
- 16 -

circumstances

showed more than mere

indifference or

lack of

diligence; they clearly established an informed decision to let a
default judgment be taken.
The summons clearly stated and Baum clearly understood that a
default

judgment would be entered

complaint.

if he did not answer the

Knowing that there was no insurance coverage and

perhaps recognizing his lack of experience in legal matters, he
contacted an attorney, who advised him that liability was almost
certain and that his best option would be to file for bankruptcy.
After

weighing

all

his

alternatives,

including

the

cost of

defending the lawsuit now or discharging the judgment later through
bankruptcy, he decided to let a default judgment be entered against
him.

Baum's decision not to appear and defend was thus an

informed, reasoned, deliberate choice, which hardly constitutes
mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect.

See Board of Educ. of

Granite School Dist. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, 808
(1963) . See also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Yuil Int'l
Trading Corp.. 105 F.R.D. 113, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Brand v. NCC
Corp., 540 F. Supp. 562, 563-64 (E.D. Pa. 1982).

Perhaps most significant, the decision not to appear but to
suffer a default judgment was not Baum's alone.

After Baum's

default had been entered but before any judgment was entered, Baum
was notified of the date of the trial on damages and apparently
notified not only his insurer but also his family's attorney, both
of whom

appeared

at trial and were given an opportunity to
- 17 -

participate.

Even then, it was not too late to have the default

set aside and the matter heard on the merits.

Yet Baum's insurer

and attorney both chose to sit by and let a default judgment be
entered.
Baum may regret his decision to allow a default judgment to be
entered against him, but bad judgment does not constitute "mistake,
inadvertence, . . . or excusable neglect" under rule 60(b)(1).
In fact, Baum has never claimed he made a bad decision.

In

moving to set aside the default judgment, he only claimed that "the
situation [has] now changed." R. at 178 5 12. The only thing that
has changed since this action was filed, however, is that USF&G has
also sued Baum, for a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to
defend or indemnify Baum, and Baum has filed a counterclaim.

See

id. 5 11. It was only after Baum counter claimed against USF&G for
bad faith in the declaratory judgment action that anyone bothered
to try to have the default judgment set aside. Now that USF&G has
apparently had second thoughts about its decision to deny Baum
coverage, it has hired an attorney to try to overturn the default
judgment.

But "insurer's remorse" is not a recognized excuse for

setting aside a default judgment under rule 60(b).

USF&G may not

be happy now with the decision to do nothing, but it had ample
opportunity to intervene on Baum's behalf before the judgment was
entered and deliberately chose not to.

It had notice of the

proceedings throughout and even appeared at trial and declined the
court's offer to participate and cross-examine the witnesses.
- 18 -

Having made the choice to deny coverage and sit by while a default
judgment was taken, USF&G cannot now go back and undo its decision
under the guise of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect on
the part of its insured.

See Candelaria v. Avitia. 269 Cal. Rptr.

32, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (an insurer was not entitled to relief
from a default judgment against its insured where the insurer
advised the plaintiff that it was denying coverage). Cf. Richas v.
Superior Court, 652 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Ariz. 1982) (insurer's failure
to establish excusable neglect is attributable to its insured).
In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
deciding that, under the facts of this case, Baum failed to show a
sufficient excuse to justify setting aside the default judgment
under rule 60(b).

The facts clearly established an informed

decision to allow a default judgment to be taken, not "mistake,
inadvertence . . .

or excusable neglect."

Rule 60(b) was not

meant to relieve a litigant from strategic or tactical decisions
which later prove to be improvident.

Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc.

v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also 7 James W.
Moore & Jo Desha Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice f 60.22 [2] at 60182 (1992) ("a party who . . . makes an informed choice as to a
particular

course

of

action

will

not

be

relieved

of

the

consequences when it subsequently develops that the choice was
unfortunate").

"There must be an end to litigation someday, and

free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved from."
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950).
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II •
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT
WAS UNTIMELY,
Before Baum could obtain relief from the judgment, he had the
burden of convincing the trial court not only that the judgment was
entered against him through excusable neglect (or one of the other
reasons specified in rule 60(b)), but also that his motion to set
aside the judgment was timely.

State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053,

1055-56 (Utah 1983).
Baum's motion to set aside the default and default judgment
was filed on September 11, 1992, more than three months after the
default he asked to have set aside, which was entered on May 18,
1992, and nearly three months after the default judgment, which was
entered on June 17, 1992. Baum argues that his motion was timely
because it was filed within three months of the default judgment.
Rule 60(b), however, requires that a motion to set aside a
judgment for mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect be made
"within a reasonable time and . . . not more than 3 months after
the judgment . . . was entered or taken."
(emphasis added).

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)

Utah courts have not yet addressed the issue,

but courts construing the analogous federal rule have held that a
motion for relief from judgment can still be untimely even if it is
filed within the outside time limit specified in the rule if, under
the circumstances, it was not filed within a reasonable time. See.
e.g., Simon v. Pay Tel Management, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1219, 1228
- 20 -

(N.D. 111. 1991), aff'd, 952 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1992) (table);
Cavalier Label Co. v. S.S. Lilika, 71 F.R.D. 395, 397 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).5

Thus, the fact that Baum's motion was filed barely within

three months after the default judgment was entered does not
necessarily make that motion timely.

As the delay in making the

motion approaches the outer limits of the allowable time, the
burden on the defendant to show that the delay was reasonable
increases.

Amoco

Overseas

Oil

Co.

v.

Compaanie

Nationale

Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1979).
Admittedly, Slingerland did not argue in the trial court that
Baum's motion was untimely because it was not filed within a
reasonable time after the default judgment.6

However, this court

can affirm the district court on any proper ground.

See, e.g. ,

Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1078 n.20
(Utah 1991); Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895
(Utah 1988) . Where the trial court does not specify the basis for
its denial of a motion to set aside a final order or judgment, the
appellate court can sustain its action if it appears from the
record that the motion was not filed within a reasonable time.

5

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is substantially similar
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). This court can therefore
look to federal courts' interpretation of the federal rule when
construing the Utah rule. See Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 1984).
6

Slingerland challenged the timeliness of Baum's motion only
as it related to the default certificate. R. at 191.
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Young v. Western Piling & Sheeting, 680 P.2d 394, 395 (Utah 1984).
Moreover, even if Slingerland were precluded from arguing that
Baum's motion was barred solely because it was untimely, the trial
court could properly consider Baum's promptness or dilatoriness in
bringing the motion when it exercised its discretion to deny the
motion.

See, e.g.. American Metals Serv. Export Co. v. Ahrens

Aircraft. Inc. , 666 F.2d 718, 720 (1st Cir. 1981) . See also Young,
680 P.2d at 395 (the trial court acted well within its discretion
in denying a motion in view of the laches of the movant).
In deciding whether a rule 60(b) motion was brought within a
reasonable time, courts have considered the interest in finality,
the reason for the delay, the litigant's practical ability to learn
earlier of the grounds he relied on and the prejudice to the
opposing party. See, e.g., Ashford v. Steuart. 657 F.2d 1053, 1055
(9th Cir. 1981).
Here, Baum knew of his potential liability and contacted his
insurance company before any action was even filed. He was served
with process on February 11, 1992.

His time to answer the

complaint expired on March 2, 1992. He had another two and a half
months before Slingerland

even sought a default certificate.

Another month passed before the trial on damages. Baum clearly had
notice of the trial. In fact, two attorneys appeared at the trial
—one on behalf of Baum and his father and one on behalf of the
family's insurer. They chose not to participate in the trial, and
a default judgment was entered.

Baum then waited nearly three
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months to file a motion to set aside that judgment—well after the
time for appealing from the judgment had expired.

In fact, it was

only after the Baums had counterclaimed against USF&G for bad faith
that USF&G retained counsel to bring a motion on Baum's behalf.
Also, the prejudice to Slingerland if the judgment were set aside
was apparent.

See infra pt. IV.

All of these facts and circumstances were before the trial
court. The trial court could reasonably conclude from these facts
that Baum's motion was untimely.

In any event, this court cannot

say that, in light of all the facts, the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment.

III.
BAUM DID NOT MEET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE.
The third element which Baum had to meet to prevail on his
rule 60(b) (1) motion was to show that he had a meritorious defense
to Slingerland's claims.

See State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053,

1055-56 (Utah 1983).
Baum claims that the merits of the case are not an issue on a
motion to set aside a default judgment.

Appellant's Brief at 10.

Slingerland agrees that the trial court did not have to consider
whether or not Baum had a meritorious defense, not because Baum did
not have to show a meritorious defense, but because Baum did not
meet his threshold burden of showing excusable neglect or some
other reason justifying relief from the default judgment.
- 23 -

The

existence of a meritorious defense, standing alone, does not excuse
the defendant's failure to abide by the rules of procedure.

See,

e.g., Simon v. Pay Tel Management, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1219, 1230
(N.D. 111. 1991), aff'd, 952 F. Supp. 1398 (7th Cir. 1992) (table).
It is clear that, under Utah law, the issue of a meritorious
defense does not even arise until the movant first establishes a
sufficient excuse for allowing a default judgment to be entered
against him.

In Board of Education of Granite School District v.

Cox, one of the cases Baum relies on,7 the court stated:
Appellant . . . has set forth defenses which apply
to the merits of the case and have no application as to
why appellant did not answer within the time allotted.
We are concerned only with why he did not answer, not
with what kind of answer would he give if he were so
inclined.
This latter question arises only after
consideration of the first question and a sufficient
excuse therefrom being shown.
14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (1963) (emphasis added).

Where,

as here, the movant fails to establish excusable neglect or some
other recognized excuse for a default judgment, neither the trial
court nor this court has to reach the issue of meritorious defense.
See Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1056 ("it is unnecessary, and moreover
inappropriate, to even consider the issue of meritorious defenses
unless the court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been

7

In Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), the other
case Baum relies on, the court said, "Usually, it is not
appropriate on Rule 60(b) motions to examine the merits of the
claim decided by the default judgment." 684 P.2d at 55 (emphasis
added). In other words, it was Slingerland, not Baum, who did not
have to establish the merits of his claim.
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shown"); Warren v, Dixon Ranch Co, . 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741, 744
(1953) (having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting the defendant's proffered excuse, "it
becomes unnecessary to consider the question of whether or not
appellant had a meritorious defense")•

Thus, the trial court did

not err in failing to expressly address the merits of Baum's
asserted defense.
Moreover, Baum did not meet his burden of establishing a
meritorious defense.
"A meritorious defense is one which sets forth specific and
sufficiently detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted
in a judgment different from the one entered." Musselman, 667 P.2d
at 1057 (quoting Lopez v. Reserve Ins. Co., 525 P.2d 1204, 1206
(Colo. Ct. App. 1974)).
Baum did not even raise the issue of meritorious defense in
his moving papers.

See R. at 169-79.

The only evidence Baum

offered to show a meritorious defense was his own affidavit, in
which he admitted that, while he was driving his car with Toby
Slingerland as a passenger, he "momentarily fell asleep, the car
rolled,

and

accident."

Toby

Slingerland

R. at 176 5 2.

was

seriously

injured

in

the

His affidavit also indicated that he

had talked to an attorney who advised him that "liability is almost
certain."

Id. at 177 J 9.

Baum's affidavit failed to show any defense—let alone a
meritorious defense—to

Slingerland's claims.
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Cf. Wilcox v.

Parkland Dev. Corp,, 550 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (App. Div. 1990) (where
the only affidavit addressing the liability issue did no more than
imply that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory
negligence, it was reasonable to conclude that the defendant's only
defense was an "uncompelling one").
testimony

at

the

damages

Relying on Slingerland's

trial, however,

Baum

argues

that

Slingerland's comparative fault in agreeing to return home without
sleep, in going to sleep on the way home, in taking off his seat
belt and in yelling at Baum when he started to go off the road
constitutes a meritorious defense.
Although Slingerland testified that he and Baum had been at
Wendover most of the night and decided to drive home after they
started getting tired, Slingerland also testified that they stopped
on their way home so that Baum could get a Coke, and Slingerland
asked Baum "if he'd be okay." R. at 256. Apparently, Baum said he
would, and Slingerland thought Baum would be all right because "he
had been working graveyards at Blockbuster like the past four
months before this."

Id.

It was only then that Slingerland took

off his seat belt and went to sleep.
Slingerland's failure to use his seat belt did not constitute
a

meritorious

defense,

and

evidence

of

that

failure

inadmissible on the issues of both liability and damages.

was
Utah

Code Ann. § 41-6-186 (1988).
Moreover, even if Slingerland were comparatively negligent in
agreeing to go home when he and Baum were tired, it is highly
- 26 -

unlikely that a jury would apportion more fault to Slingerland, the
sleeping

passenger,

comparative
altogether.

than

to

Baum,

the

fault of Slingerland would

driver.

Thus,

any

not bar his recovery

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1992).

Baum would

still be liable for at least 51 percent of Slingerland's damages—
$2.87 million.

There is no indication that Baum could pay this

judgment any more than he could pay the $5,623,829 judgment or that
he would have decided not to suffer a default judgment if he had
known his liability would have only been $2.87 million.

Thus, as

a practical matter, any defense Baum may have had based on
Slingerland's alleged comparative fault would not have resulted in
a different judgment because it would not have made any difference
in Baum's decision to forego a trial and allow a default judgment
to be entered.
Baum also claims that the jury should have been allowed to
consider the amount of damages. He claims that the court's special
damage award of $4.6 million was based "on the brief testimony of
Paul Randle[,] which was accepted without significant inquiry by
the court and without any cross-examination." Appellant's Brief at
11-12 (citation omitted) . He claims that he should have been given
an opportunity to have his attorney "examine the evidence" and, "if
appropriate," to present his own witnesses on the plaintiff's
damage claim.

R. at 178 f 12.

In fact, Baum had an opportunity to have his attorney "examine
the evidence" on Slingerland's damage claim.
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Attorneys for both

USF&G and the Baums attended the damage trial. At the beginning of
the trial, the court invited the attorneys' participation: "If
either of you had any interest in respect to your respective
clients in terms of examining or questioning any of the evidence
that might be presented before the court I would like to hear that.
. . . [I]f there were to be information that could help me evaluate
this better it would be appreciated."

R. at 238. Before closing,

the court again invited counsel to cross-examine any of the
witnesses or make any other comments.

Jd. at 307.

Counsel for

Baum and his insurer declined all of the court's invitations to
participate and "examine the evidence."
If Dr. Randle's testimony was "brief," it was only because he
had prepared a thorough report setting out the plaintiff's damages,
which the court had reviewed before trial. See id. at 245. Thus,
there was no need for Dr. Randle to testify at length.

Moreover,

Judge Young did not accept Dr. Randle's figures uncritically.

In

fact, he criticized them as being perhaps too conservative, jjd. at
3 08, and actually increased Dr. Randle's figures for the present
value of future income loss by 20 percent, id.
In

short, Baum

meritorious defense.

did

not meet

his

at 3 09.

burden

of

showing

a

In any event, he had every opportunity to

present his defense to the court earlier but deliberately chose not
to.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to set aside the default judgment.
Supp. at 1230.
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See Simon, 782 F.

IV.
SLINGERLAND WILL BE PREJUDICED
IF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS SET ASIDE.
Finally, Baum claims that Slingerland will not be prejudiced
if the default judgment is set aside.

He further claims that

Slingerland never claimed or offered any evidence of prejudice in
his memorandum in opposition to Baum's motion to set aside the
default judgment and therefore cannot raise the issue of prejudice
for the first time on appeal.
Admittedly, Slingerland did not claim prejudice below.

That

is because the issue of prejudice was never properly before the
trial court.

The issue of prejudice does not even arise until

after the movant has established a prima facie case entitling him
to relief from the judgment.

The court may then consider whether

or not the plainitff will be prejudiced if the judgment is set
aside. The lack of prejudice, standing alone, is not sufficient to
justify setting aside a default judgment. See, e.g., United States
v. Proceeds of Sale of 3,888 Pounds Atlantic Sea Scallops. 857 F.2d
46, 49 (1st Cir. 1988); Barry Howard & Assocs. , Inc. v. Indiana
Transp. Museum, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 487, 491 (S.D. Ind. 1989). On the
other hand, even if the movant clearly shows a sufficient excuse
for the default judgment, timeliness and a meritorious defense, the
court still has discretion to deny relief if to do so would
prejudice the plaintiff.
(9th Cir. 1988) .

Cassidy v. Tenorio, 856 F.2d 1412, 1415

In other words, the existence or lack of
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prejudice is simply one factor the trial court can consider in the
exercise of its sound discretion to grant or deny relief.

See

Maine Nat'l Bank v. F/V Cecily B (O.N. 677261), 116 F.R.D. 66, 69
(D. Me. 1987) .

But the burden was on Baum to show that granting

relief from the judgment would not prejudice Slingerland.

See

Allegheny Int'l Credit Corp. v. Virginia Chain Distribs.. Inc.. 97
F.R.D. 17, 19 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
Baum's moving papers did not make out a prima facie case
entitling him to relief from the judgment.
also supra pts. I-III.

See R. at 169-79; see

Nor did he meet his burden of showing that

Slingerland would not be prejudiced if the judgment were set aside.
See id.

Therefore, Slingerland did not have to address the issue

of prejudice in his memorandum, and the court did not err in not
reaching the issue.
Although the trial court did not expressly address the issue
of

prejudice—and

this

court

need

not

reach

the

issue—the

prejudice to Slingerland is readily apparent from the record, and
this court can affirm the trial court's decision on any proper
ground. See, e.g. , Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892,
895 (Utah 1988).
In addition to the usual prejudice resulting from delay, such
as

faded

memories

and

stale

evidence,

Slingerland

would

be

prejudiced by an order setting aside the default judgment in this
case for at least three reasons. First, setting aside the judgment
would delay Slingerland's recovery and thus cause him further
- 30 -

economic loss.

See Allegheny, 97 F.R.D. at 19.

Second, if the

judgment were vacated, Slingerland would lose his priority over
Baum's other creditors.

See Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Bles

Studs, Inc., 803 P.2d 775, 778 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), review denied,
812 P.2d 828 (Or. 1991).

Third, Slingerland has already gone to

the time and expense of trying his damage claims once and would be
forced to incur those expenses all over again.
trial,

witnesses

testified.

from

Logan,

Utah,

See R. at 242 & 283.

and

At the damage

Fresno,

California,

Slingerland would have to bring

them to Salt Lake City to testify again, and they would be put to
the added inconvenience of having to testify a second time.

Cf.

Master v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573, 573 (1962) (where
the plaintiff had traveled from Washington to testify at the
default hearing and independent witnesses had been called, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief from a
default judgment).
CONCLUSION
The defendant's own testimony showed that his decision to
suffer a default judgment was an informed, deliberate, tactical
decision.

Thus, he failed to meet his burden of showing mistake,

inadvertence or excusable neglect that would justify setting aside
the default and default judgment.

The defendant also failed to

meet his burden of showing that his motion was timely, that he had
a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's claims and that the
- 31 -

plaintiff would not be prejudiced if the judgment were set aside.
Accordingly, under the facts of this case, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default and
default judgment. The judgment of the trial court should therefore
be affirmed.
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)fraud(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.

